

# Medical Device Cybersecurity Workforce Development

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**Eileen Division**  
**The MITRE Corporation**

**NICE Conference**  
**November 19, 2019**

# Agenda

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- **Bottom line up front**
- **Challenge**
- **The project**
  - Approach
  - Status


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# Bottom Line Up Front

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# Bottom Line Up Front


**MITRE is developing a Medical Device Cybersecurity training model for VA\* to help raise the cybersecurity competency of Healthcare Technology Management (HTM) professionals who manage and maintain networked medical devices**



Source: <http://www.industrytap.com/biomedical-engineering-revolutionizing-medicine-creating-opportunity/37543>


# Bottom Line Up Front: U.S. Veterans Administration (VA)

- The largest integrated health care system in the United States
- Current snapshot:



**1,255**

Health Care Facilities




**9+**

Million Veterans  
Enrolled



**55,000**

Networked medical devices\*  
*(as of 2017)*



**1,300+**

Healthcare Technology  
Management (HTM)  
Professionals Employed

Sources: National Center for Veterans Analysis and Statistics, [www.va.gov/vetdata](http://www.va.gov/vetdata); *Strengthening medical device cybersecurity across the healthcare ecosystem* report, <https://connect.ul.com/rs/365-LEA-623/images/LHS-UL-VA-Research-Report-StrengtheningMedicalDeviceCybersecurityAcrossTheHealthcareEcosystem.pdf>; *American College of Clinical Engineering (ACCE) News*, Volume 29 Issue 3: May—June 2019

\*55,000 networked medical devices within VA medical centers and clinics; there are an additional 55K++ networked, implantable or wearable medical devices on or in VA patients

# Bottom Line Up Front: The MITRE Corporation

- Not-for-profit, trusted third party, working in the public interest
- Cybersecurity expertise
- Since 2014, has been partnering with the U.S. Food & Drug Administration (FDA) and others to improve medical device cybersecurity



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NIST SPECIAL PUBLICATION 1800-8

## Securing Wireless Infusion Pumps in Healthcare Delivery Organizations

Includes Executive Summary (A); Approach, Architecture, and How-To Guides (C)

Gavin O'Brien  
Sallie Edwards  
Kevin Littlefield  
Neil McNab  
Sue Wang  
Kangmin Zheng

This publication is a

The first draft of this  
<https://www.nccoe.nist.gov/draft.pdf>

## Rubric for Applying CVSS to Medical Devices

Version: 0.12.04 – September 3, 2019



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## Medical Device Cybersecurity Regional Incident Preparedness and Response Playbook

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# Challenge

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# Historical Workforce Development: Different Trajectories

## Medical Devices

- **Managed by HTM professionals**
  - Biomedical engineering degree, and/or
  - Biomedical equipment technician
- **Unique hardware and function**
- **Different technologies & subspecialties**
  - Sterilization
  - Medical air
  - Imaging
- **Clinical expertise**
- **Patient safety focus**
- **Different vocabulary**
- **Organizationally within clinical organization**



## IT Systems and Networks

- **Managed by IT, system, software, hardware, and network specialists**
  - Computer science, computer engineering, information systems degree, and/or
  - Systems administration
- **More commoditized hardware and software**
  - Servers
  - Operating systems
  - Laptops
  - Applications
  - EHR
- **Availability and confidentiality focus**
  - HIPAA
- **Organizationally under CIO**





# Medical Device Risks

- **Medical devices are increasingly networked**
- **Incidents with medical devices can impact patient safety**
- **Medical devices can serve as an access point to sensitive healthcare data**





# Some Examples of Cybersecurity Risks to Networked Medical Devices<sup>1</sup>

Risk Description	C	A	I	PS
Failure to provide timely security software updates and patches to medical devices and networks and address related vulnerabilities in older medical devices (legacy devices)	X	X	X	X
Malware which alters data on a diagnostic device			X	X
Device reprogramming which alters device function (by unauthorized users, malware, etc.)	X	X	X	X
Denial of service attacks which make a device unavailable		X		X
Exfiltration of patient data or PHI from the network	X			

*C: Confidentiality, A: Availability, I: Integrity, PS: Patient Safety*

<sup>1</sup> Adapted from "Health Care Industry Cybersecurity Task Force Report," June 2017

# Challenges to Securing Medical Devices

- **Medical device inventories are often incomplete**
- **Vulnerability scanning may adversely impact medical device operation**
- **Legacy devices and platforms inhibit patching of devices**
- **Medical device cybersecurity responsibilities shared among**
  - IT staff
  - Healthcare technology management (HTM) staff
  - Device manufacturers
  - Clinicians



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# The Project

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# The Approach



## Bridging the Gap Between Knowledge and Competency

**Training Needs Analysis**

**Learning Objectives**

**Instructional Design Methods**

**Learning Assessment and Evaluation**

# Project Status

## ■ Training Needs Analysis

- Multiple interviews
  - VA/VHA staff
  - Other government (e.g., Food and Drug Administration (FDA), Defense Health Agency (DHA), and the NIST National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence)
  - Medical device manufacturers
  - Private hospitals/HDOs
  - Academia, trade associations, non-profits
- Extensive literature survey
  - 90+ articles, books, course curricula, etc.
- Training platform reviews
  - VA, Department of Defense, Department of Homeland Security, Coursera, SANS, MITRE Institute, university-sponsored, Biohacking Village, OpenICE, etc.

# Competency Gaps Identified (partial list)\*

- **Infrastructure Design:** Basic and advanced networking; configuration management
- **Threat Analysis:** Knowledge of threats and skill in identifying them
- **Vulnerabilities Assessment:** Ability to conduct vulnerability scans and recognize vulnerabilities in security systems
- **Data Privacy and Protection:** Knowledge of, and ability to apply, PHI data security standards
- **Risk Management:** HTMs as FISMA system owners and security controls assessors; RMF knowledge; system provisioning/procurement
- **Incident Management:** VA-specific incident response procedures

*\* A partial list from preliminary findings aligned to NICE competencies*





# Training Needs Analysis

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- **Shorter, continuous trainings**
  - Reinforce cybersecurity behavior/culture among HTMs
  - Build skills, not just awareness/compliance and information dissemination
- **Training for large, geographically dispersed workforce**
- **Desire for medical device cybersecurity certification for HTMs**
- **Build cybersecurity into Biomedical Engineering curriculum**
- **Hands-on, experiential learning is key**

# Experiential Learning Approach

- Hands-on skills training
- Remote access to real medical devices
- Remote access to virtual devices
- Cloud-based training
  - Prototype on MITRE cloud
  - Evolve to VA Cloud
- Facility Kits
  - Prepare kits that VA admins can install at VA Medical Center (VAMCs)
- Device Learning Kits
  - Low-cost open source medical devices bundled with lab exercises



# Looking Ahead

- Finalize training design document
- Provide recommendations and roadmap for VA HTM cybersecurity training model
- Parallel efforts to support training model
  - Continue collaboration with U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and Defense Health Agency (DHA) and **broader health/cyber community**
  - Continue medical device cybersecurity hands-on testing, collaboration, and demonstration, within MITRE and with external partners



# MITRE

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